Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
The network security is always an important issue. Because wireless is broadcast in nature, anyone within range of a wireless device can intercept the packets being sent out without interrupting the flow of data between wireless device and base station. It is because of this that wireless network security is somewhat more concentrated than that of wired networks. Wireless communication suffers from threats inherited from wired networks and those that are specific in the wireless environment. But because of its limited resource and a higher channel error rate than wired networks, those security schemes in wired network couldn't be used directly in wireless environment. So, the security protocols in wireless network should be designed to minimize the message sizes and the number of messages exchanged.
The security features for mobile communication system include: confidentiality on the air interface, anonymity of the user and, most importantly, authentication of the user to the network in order to prevent fraudulent use of the system [1] . For the lack of a physical association between the mobile nodes (MNs) and the wired network and easy access to the radio, proper authentication is necessary to protect the communication against illegal usage and to ensure that users are connected to the network that he trusts. To provide universal wireless access to services, such authentication must deal with users' roaming among areas administered by different network operators (NOs), and be implemented by users' devices with limited computing resources. During the authentication process, some secret information must be mutually agreed upon so the following communication can proceed efficiently in protected mode to achieve desired confidentiality.
In this paper, we present a simple authentication protocol providing user anonymity for wireless environments. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review previous authentication protocols for wireless environments. A simple and efficient wireless authentication protocol is presented in Section 3. In section 4, we analyze the performances of our protocol and compare our protocol with others. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 5.
II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORKS
In recent years, many authentication protocols for the wireless network have been proposed [1] - [7] . When a mobile user roaming in wireless environment, it is desirable to protect the relevant information about him. Assuring the anonymity of a mobile user prevents unintended parties from associating him with the messages to/from him or with the sessions in which he participates. The disclosure of a mobile user's identity allows unauthorized entities to track his moving history and current location. The illegal access to any information related to users location without his notice can be a serious violation of his privacy. So, anonymity is one of importance property of these protocols.
A basic solution for the provision of user anonymity is to use the temporary identity (TID) of a mobile user instead of his real one. Several security-related protocols with anonymity for wireless mobile communication systems have been proposed based on the symmetric key cryptography or the public key cryptography [1] - [7] . However, in a mobile communication system, there are a few things to consider when security protocols are being designed. First, the low computational power of mobile devices should be considered, which means a security protocol requiring heavy computation on the mobile nodes is not adequate. Secondly, wireless mobile communication networks have a lower bandwidth and a higher channel error rate than wired networks. So, the security protocols should be designed to minimize the message sizes and the number of messages exchanged. Our proposed authentication scheme is based on the public key cryptosystems, but mobile users only do symmetric encryption and decryption. In our protocol, it takes only one round of message exchange between the mobile user and the visited network, and one round of message exchange between the visited network and the corresponding home network. The most significant feature is one-time use of key between mobile user and visited network.
III. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a simple and efficient authentication protocol with anonymity for wireless environment.
A. The Model
In wireless environments, MN indicates mobile user, HA indicates home agent of a mobile user MN, and FA indicates foreign agent of the network that a mobile user MN wants to visit. A simplified model is shown in Fig. 1 
B. Protocol goals
We will consider the security goals that may be achieved after the successful run of the wireless authentication protocol. They include the following: mutual authentication of mobile user and visited network mutual agreement of shared secret key mutual implicit key authentication assurance of session key freshness non-repudiation of origin for relevant user data confidentiality of relevant data user anonymity as a data origin and destination As well as these requirements, another factor in design of authentication protocol for the wireless environment is the limited resource of the mobile devices.
C. Notations
We use the following notations: 
D. Initial Assumptions
We assume a protocol environments of wireless mobile system in which the proposed authentication protocol is executed. In this paper, we assume that we have a network in which centralized PKI or KDC (Key Distribution Center) is available. In our network, both HA and FA possess X.509 public key certificates issued by hierarchies of certification authorities (CAs).
A certificate defined in X.509 contains the user's public key and other information and a signature of this information by CA. For example, the equations below are certificates.
) 
where " ⊕ " indicates the bit-wise XOR operation, "||" is concatenation.
E. Design of Authentication Protocol
In this section, we propose a simple and efficient wireless authentication scheme with user anonymity. The protocol has two phases: in the first phase, FA authenticates to MN and establishes a session key; in the second phase, MN visits FA and FA serves for MN. We now describe our scheme.
1) The first phase In this phase, FA authenticates MN each other through HA. If MN is a legal user of HA, FA will issue a temporary certificate MN TCert to MN, which will be used in second phase when MN communicates with FA. Fig. 2 shows the authentication process. 
Step1 MN
→ VA When a mobile user MN enters a new foreign network FA
2) The second phase
When MN visits FA at ith session, M sends the follows message to FA: .
. . PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We evaluate our proposal with respect to protocol goals considered in the beginning of the protocol design. Concerning the protocol goals required in wireless authentication protocol, our scheme satisfies the goals as has been presented.
A. Security
In the first phase of our protocol, its security is based on the hash function and smart cards. When HA authenticates FA each other, we use the public key encryption algorithm, whose security is based on the difficult problem of disperse logarithm.
In step 1, MN computes temporary key L using hash function and smart cards. The security of hash and the privacy of the big number N assure the unforgability of r , n and L . The temporary key L contains timestamp, which ensures its freshness.
In step 2, for verifying whether MN is legal user, FA forwards the information containing the request information of MN and the certificate of FA. The signature over the hashed value of message provides the implicit entity authentication. The hash operation assures the integrity of information and random number b can prevent from replay attack.
In step 3, HA assures the freshness of information using random number and prevent from replay attack using the timestamp.
In step 4, FA trusts MN because FA trusts HA. On the other hand, MN trusts FA because MN trusts HA. The trust relation between MN and FA is established through HA.
In the second phase, the MN can prove himself by presenting 
B. Anonymity and Untraceability
In our protocol, the anonymity of MN is obtained by hash function and smart cards. MN hides his real identity in (1) . Only HA can get the real identity of MN using (2) because HA knows the secret number N .
If user certificate is used several times in the protocol, the user may be traced. So, we use one-time key and a temporary certificate when MN communicates with FA in our protocol to get the untraceability.
C. Implementation Requirements
Because of the considerations about hardware complexity, battery power, and computation delay, some mobile units, e.g., pocket cellular telephones, cannot perform complicated operations that require expensive hardware or are timeconsuming. So, we consider a computational load on user part of the proposed scheme. Our scheme is based on the public key cryptosystems, but mobile users only do symmetric encryption and decryption. In our protocol, it takes only one round of message exchange between the mobile user and the visited network, and one round of message exchange between the visited network and the corresponding home network. The most significant computation required on the user part is the operation of symmetric encryption. By avoiding employing public key cryptography on the user part, we keep the computation cost down on user part.
We compare our scheme with the previous protocols [1] , [3] . Table 1 shows our protocol is much more practical and efficient in terms of communication and computation cost, because both of the XOR operations and concatenation can be done very efficiently compared to multiplication with the same length of operands.
Ⅴ Ⅴ Ⅴ Ⅴ . CONCLUSION
In wireless mobile communication system, user anonymity and user authentication have been addressed. The advantage of our proposed authenticating mobile users protocol is simple and efficient. The security of the proposed scheme relies on the two assumptions: tamper-proof devices and the security of the one-way scheme. Our scheme is based on the public key cryptosystems, but mobile users only do symmetric encryption and decryption. In our protocol, it takes only one round of message exchange between the mobile user and the visited network, and one round of message exchange between the visited network and the corresponding home network. The most significant feature is one-time use of key between mobile user and visited network. 
